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External Corporate Governance and Financial Fraud: Cognitive Evaluation 





Agency theory suggests that external governance mechanisms (e.g., activist owners, the market for 
corporate control, securities analysts) can deter managers from acting opportunistically. Using 
cognitive evaluation theory, we argue that powerful expectations imposed by external governance 
can impinge on top managers’ feelings of autonomy and crowd out their intrinsic motivation, 
potentially leading to financial fraud. Our findings indicate that external pressure from activist 
owners, the market for corporate control, and securities analysts increases managers’ likelihood of 
financial fraud. Our study considers external governance from a top manager’s perspective and 
questions one of agency theory’s foundational tenets: that external pressure imposed on managers 





Many of us are familiar with stories about top managers ‘cooking the books’ in one way or another. 
As a result, companies and regulatory bodies often implement strict controls to try to prevent 
financial fraud. However, cognitive evaluation theory describes how those external controls could 
actually have the opposite of their intended effect because they rob managers of their intrinsic 
motivation for behaving appropriately. We find this to be the case. When top managers face more 
stringent external control mechanisms, in the form of activist shareholders, the threat of a takeover, 
or zealous securities analysts, they are actually more likely to engage in financial misbehavior. 
 







Strategy scholars and policymakers have devoted renewed attention in recent years to ‘external’ 
mechanisms of corporate governance, such as the monitoring and control by stakeholders that are 
not inside the organization. For example, a recent review of this literature seeks to ‘bring external 
corporate governance into the corporate governance puzzle’ more fully (Aguilera et al., 2015). 
Governance research has yielded important insights about these external governance mechanisms 
(Coffee, 2006), but few have considered their potentially adverse ramifications. Toward this end, we 
incorporate a behavioral perspective of managers into our understanding of external governance to 
highlight how the expectations imposed by external governance could impose on managers’ 
motivation, and we thus uncover the potential harm such governance mechanisms might introduce. 
Recent developments in agency theory research relax the theory’s assumption of purely 
economic agents (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). For example, behavioral agency theory 
reevaluates predictions in view of more realistic assumptions about agent behavior, with particular 
emphasis on internal governance (Pepper and Gore, 2015). Researchers have incorporated prospect 
theory (Martin, Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 2013) and equity theory (Pepper, Gosling and Gore, 
2015) into agency theory predictions about how compensation structures influence managerial 
behavior. We build on the notion of overlaying cognitive biases onto agency theory prescriptions 
and extend this approach to external governance mechanisms. In particular, we inquire into how 
agents feel about external monitoring and control and what this means for their intrinsic motivation 
to behave ethically. 
Cognitive evaluation theory (Boal and Cummings, 1981; Deci, 1971, 1975) is particularly 
informative in this regard because it explains how external controls can actually be 
counterproductive. The fundamental tenet of cognitive evaluation theory is that intrinsically 
motivated behavior is a function of a person’s need to feel self-determining in their decisions 
(Phillips and Lord, 1981). The theory asserts that external monitoring and controls ‘crowd out’ an 
4 
 
individual’s motivation to behave in ways the controls are designed to ensure (Frey and Jegen, 2001). 
In our context, this would suggest that pressure from external governance lessens managers’ feelings 
of autonomy, thereby decreasing their intrinsic motivation to behave in ways that the governance 
mechanisms are supposed to safeguard against (Deci and Ryan, 2000). In this study, we ask whether 
external governance weakens managers’ intrinsic motivation to act in the interest of shareholders 
and behave appropriately in the context of financial reporting. 
Managerial financial fraud (e.g., inappropriately booking revenue, improperly valuing assets, 
not disclosing material information) is a phenomenon that is drawing extensive industry and 
regulatory attention (Eaglesham and Rapoport, 2015). In fact, in 2014 alone the SEC announced 93 
investigations against publicly traded companies for alleged financial misconduct. As a result, 
governance scholars are acutely interested in how to predict and prevent its occurrence. Agency 
theory suggests that internal governance reduces information asymmetry between those inside and 
outside the firm and, consequently, decreases the likelihood of fraud (Dalton et al., 2007). We, 
however, suggest and find that pressure from external governance may impose hidden agency costs 
as managers shift their locus of causality outward and lose their intrinsic motivation to ethically 
report their firms’ performance, thus resulting in a greater likelihood of financial fraud. 
Our study introduces a key behavioral consideration into agency theory’s predictions about 
external governance, uncovering some counterintuitive relationships. For instance, we found that 
the ‘highest quality’ principals (Higgins and Gulati, 2006) are positively associated with the likelihood 
of fraud. Conversely, organizational provisions that many thought would lead to managerial 
entrenchment, such as poison pills and golden parachutes (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009), 
actually bear a negative association with the likelihood of financial fraud.  
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Agency theory  
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Recent agency theory formulations focus on how agents behave in boundedly rational ways 
(Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The behavioral agency model (BAM) was developed largely to 
overcome criticisms regarding static assumptions about executives’ risk preferences (Wiseman and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Empirical research on behavioral agency theory to date has focused mainly on 
behavioral risk propensities and internal governance using prospect theory arguments (Chrisman 
and Patel, 2012). For instance, this line of study re-examines compensation risk, highlighting the 
importance of individual problem framing to explain how risk influences executive behavior 
(Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007; Martin et al., 2013).  
Following this model, we extend agency theory by applying behavioral considerations to 
three forms of external governance (we define ‘external’ as being those forms of governance that 
operate without full access to the firm’s inside information). Within agency theory, one form of 
external governance is a firm’s owners, which serves as a market-based governance mechanism 
(Baysinger, Kosnik and Turk, 1991). From an agency perspective, managers are also subject to the 
market for corporate control, which researchers sometimes describe as a governance mechanism of last 
resort (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). More recently, agency theory scholars have begun to investigate 
rating agencies (i.e., securities analysts) as another form of external governance (Chen, Harford and 
Lin, 2015; Wiersema and Zhang, 2011). There are other external forces that act on firms beyond the 
three mentioned here (e.g., legal institutions, social activists), but we limit our investigation to these 
three because they are the most central and influential forms of external governance within the 
agency framework.  
We also add to agency theory by considering a key cognitive bias that challenges the theory’s 
economic assumptions. Specifically, we theorize about how to incorporate trade-offs between 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation into agency theory models (c.f., Boivie, Graffin and Pollock, 2012; 
Pepper and Gore, 2015). We use cognitive evaluation theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985) to explain how 
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external governance mechanisms introduce high expectations on managers that serve as an extrinsic 
motivational force, which could crowd out intrinsic motivation, so that the combined effect is 
actually the opposite of what was intended with respect to preventing fraudulent behavior. 
Cognitive evaluation theory 
The concepts underlying cognitive evaluation theory emerged from the study of how external 
pressure affects internal motivation to do what is right. Some described this in terms of a ‘crowding-
out effect,’ wherein excessive external rewards and punishments can subvert intrinsic motivation to 
behave ethically (Bertelli, 2006; Georgellis, Iossa and Tabvuma, 2011). Originators of the theory 
predicated their ideas on the assumption that individuals have innate needs for autonomy and 
competence (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Autonomy concerns ‘the experience of acting with a sense of 
choice, volition and self-determination’ and competence is about ‘the belief that one has the ability 
to influence important outcomes’ (Stone, Deci and Ryan, 2009, p.77). The level of autonomy and 
competence that individuals perceive they have is a powerful determinant of their intrinsic 
motivation (Deci and Ryan, 2012; Gagne and Deci, 2005).  
 In the cognitive evaluation theory framework, when external mechanisms of control impinge 
on an individual’s sense of autonomy and control, it could thereby decrease his or her internal 
motivation to behave in ways that the external controls were supposed to ensure (Osterloh, Frost 
and Frey, 2002). Consistent with these ideas, a number of studies in management support the notion 
that external consequences could potentially reduce individuals’ motivation to behave in ways that 
are consistent with their responsibilities to the firm (e.g., Barkema, 1995; Jacquart and Armstrong, 
2013). For example, Osterloh and Frey (2000) argued that high levels of extrinsic motivators can 
curtail employees’ intrinsic motivation to engage in organizational citizenship behavior, thus 
hindering them from transferring tacit knowledge. Similarly, Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) 
contended that top managers oftentimes perceive external controls as coercive, reducing their desire 
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to put forth effort. Our study builds on these ideas to develop specific hypotheses about how some 
of the most commonly investigated mechanisms of external corporate governance affect the 
likelihood of managerial financial fraud. 
HYPOTHESES 
Financial fraud 
Financial fraud occurs when managers take actions that deceive investors or other key stakeholders 
(Gande and Lewis, 2009; Shi, Connelly and Sanders, 2016). It often involves corruption, lying about 
facts, failure to disclose material information, falsifying information about the firm’s performance, or 
covering up systematic problems (Baucus and Near, 1991). There may be benefits to financial fraud 
that motivate managers to engage in such actions, such as the appearance of improved performance 
or increases in contingent compensation. However, financial fraud harms investors, and especially 
those who hold the firm’s stock over long periods. 
As a result, external stakeholders attempt to curtail executive misbehavior in the form of 
financial fraud by increasing their levels of monitoring and control (Davidoff, 2013). Standard 
economic approaches, including agency theory, consider the relative costs and benefits of fraud to 
determine the extrinsic motivation necessary to ensure that individuals will not engage in such 
scandalous behavior (Becker, 1976). Working within these theoretical frames, a large body of 
empirical work has found external governance mechanisms that focus on monitoring and 
disciplining managers for misbehavior can reduce the likelihood of financial fraud (Beasley et al., 
2000; Chen et al., 2006). Few, however, have considered the psychological impact of these external 
corporate controls.  
Mechanisms of external governance 
The first external governance mechanism we consider is the firm’s owners (Brav et al., 2008; 
Hoskisson, Castleton and Withers, 2009). Researchers examining shareholder influence on firm 
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outcomes focus largely on institutional investors, such as mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, 
banks, insurance companies, and endowments (Goranova, Dharwadkar and Brandes, 2010). One 
type of investor resides at the extreme with respect to their ability to monitor and control: dedicated 
institutional investors (Bushee, 1998, 2004). Porter (1992) described dedicated owners as being those 
that maintain large, long-term holdings concentrated in a small number of firms. These owners have 
incentive to monitor executive behavior and are able to understand rich and complex information 
about firms in which they invest (Higgins and Gulati, 2006). As such, they introduce high 
expectations on managers because they are closely attuned to managerial performance. 
Dedicated institutional investors have a unique variety of tools at their disposal to control 
managers and demand results, which makes them an unusually potent force of external governance 
(Connelly et al., 2010a; Goranova and Ryan, 2014). By definition, dedicated institutional investors 
own substantial portions of firms in their portfolios. Thus, they are endowed with immense power 
over top managers because their exit would almost certainly be followed by a sizeable drop in the 
firm’s stock price (Bushee, 2004). Under the threat of exit, this class of investors can demand that 
managers offer consistently high performance maintained over time (Koh, 2007; Maffett, 2012). 
Dedicated institutional investors also affect managerial expectations by exercising voice-based 
governance (Filatotchev and Toms, 2006; Goranova and Ryan, 2014). Dedicated owners frequently 
undertake shareholder resolutions, launch proxy contests, and initiate media campaigns to coerce 
managers (Wahal and McConnell, 2000). This group of owners is particularly adept at leading 
activism activities among shareholders (Gaspar, Massa and Matos, 2005). They often support activist 
shareholders who push managers to maximize performance, which can give rise to  excess pressure 
faced by managers (Martin, 2011).  
Traditional agency theory predicts that a higher level of dedicated institutional ownership 
should be associated with a reduced likelihood of moral hazard (Sharma, 2004). One of the main 
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reasons is that managers should be fearful of the negative repercussions of being caught, which they 
might know is more likely to occur when the firm has high levels of dedicated institutional 
ownership. Information asymmetry between principals and agents should be lower for dedicated 
owners as compared to other types of owners (Weiss and Beckerman, 1995). This is because 
dedicated owners have extensive resources to devote to monitoring managerial behavior and, given 
the nature of their holdings, are motivated to monitor managers carefully (Connelly et al., 2010a). 
Close monitoring and low levels of information asymmetry should constrain self-serving managerial 
manipulations of financial information by increasing the risk of detection (Hadani, Goranova and 
Khan, 2011). In other words, agency theory highlights the notion that dedicated investors could 
heighten managerial concerns about being caught for wrongdoing, thus mitigating the likelihood of 
financial fraud. 
Incorporating cognitive evaluation theory, on the other hand, uncovers a hidden problem 
with this agency theory prediction by accounting for how CEOs might feel about the external 
expectations that come with high levels of dedicated ownership. As one observer noted: ‘The 
perception that activism creates greater value for all shareholders has won the sympathy and support 
of major institutional investors that traditionally have remained passive when it comes to engaging 
with the companies in their portfolios’ (Duffy, 2015). The heavy hand of dedicated institutional 
investors could prompt managers to shift from an internal to an external locus of causality, making 
them potentially less concerned with doing business honestly than they are with outward perceptions 
of compliance (Osterloh and Frey, 2004). This shift in managers’ locus of causality helps explain 
why traditional agency theory predictions about external governance may not apply, and in fact we 
expect to see results that are more consistent with stewardship arguments with a focus on intrinsic 
motivation (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003).  
In the cognitive evaluation theory framework, external intervention could crowd out 
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managers’ intrinsic motivation to act ethically. This is especially so, given that such monitoring is 
often focused on continually positive financial returns, so managers may become more likely to 
compromise their ideals by engaging in financial fraud that appears to meet dedicated owners’ 
persistent external expectations, even though managers know it is wrong. Argyris (1964) was one of 
the first to recognize the potential for this phenomenon when he noticed that strict governance has 
a paradoxical effect: it leads to continuously expanding control but at the same time reduces 
managerial loyalty. When dedicated institutional ownership is high, top managers, subject to 
unrelenting external expectations from dedicated institutional investors and activists, may feel 
compelled to make financial reporting decisions not from their own beliefs but merely to satisfy the 
expectations of the firm’s owners. Therefore, we suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: A firm’s level of dedicated institutional ownership is positively associated 
with the likelihood of financial fraud. 
 
Another commonly considered form of external governance is the market for corporate 
control (Weir, 2013). The market for corporate control imposes external pressure on managers to 
deliver consistently positive financial earnings reports because, if they do not, other management 
teams may attempt to gain control of the company (Hitt et al., 1996). It is difficult to directly 
measure the extent to which this governance mechanism is at work because it is an unobservable 
force until it is activated (i.e., until the poor performing firm is acquired). However, we can view the 
extent to which executives are exposed to the market for corporate control by looking at the firm’s 
takeover defense provisions (Humphery-Jenner, 2014). Although takeover defenses are internal, 
researchers often use them as a means of examining the extent to which managers are subject to the 
external governance of the market for corporate control (Humphery-Jenner, 2014; Kabir, Cantrijn 
and Jeunink, 1997). 
Common takeover defenses include supermajorities, staggered board appointments, poison 
pills, and golden parachutes. Kini, Kracaw and Mian (2004) argued that the disciplinary function of 
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the market for corporate control is largely ineffective when firms have takeover defenses such as 
these. As a result, external expectations to perform that arise from the market for corporate control 
are likely to be less dogged when managers enjoy more and better takeover protections. In contrast, 
managers experience greater pressure and higher expectations from the market for corporate control 
when their company has fewer, or weak, takeover defenses (Mahoney, Sundaramurthy and 
Mahoney, 1997).  
Traditional agency theory predicts that a higher level of takeover defenses (and thus an 
ineffective market for corporate control) should be associated with a greater likelihood of moral 
hazard (McGurn, 2002). Agency theorists would argue that these types of provisions give rise to 
managerial entrenchment and increase agency costs (Bebchuk et al., 2009; Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick, 2003). As a result, though managers generally want takeover defenses, most existing studies 
focus on how they can be bad for shareholders (Mahoney et al., 1997; Sundaramurthy, Mahoney and 
Mahoney, 1997). From a purely economic view of the agent, takeover defenses can reduce or even 
eliminate the potentially negative outcomes associated with committing financial fraud. If they are 
less concerned about the consequences of being caught, managers may be more likely to inflate 
numbers or adjust financial reports to garner private benefits.  
Cognitive evaluation theory, on the other hand, offers a different perspective. Top managers 
of firms with strong takeover defense protection may not be overly concerned about employment 
safety, even if their companies fail to meet external performance expectations and thereby become 
takeover targets. Put differently, top managers are more likely to make decisions that reflect their 
own values and beliefs when the company has ample takeover defenses in place. In the absence of 
those provisions, though, failing to meet performance expectations would increase top managers’ 
employment risk  (Kacperczyk, 2009). Without takeover defenses, the threat of a takeover could 
alter the risk propensity of top managers, potentially leading them to make short-term financial 
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reporting decisions. Takeover defense provisions protect top managers from the external pressure 
of the market for corporate control, affording managers an extra measure of decision autonomy and 
allowing them to think about the long term when reporting their performance (Wang, Zhao and He, 
forthcoming).  
The imposing presence of external expectations from the market for corporate control could 
crowd out managers’ intrinsic motivation to behave ethically and, vice versa, removing those 
external expectations could activate managers’ intrinsic sense of duty to do what is right (Kanfer, 
1990), as is consistent with stewardship theory (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). In fact, being 
vulnerable to the market for corporate control may be particularly salient to the problem of financial 
fraud. Financial fraud encompasses a range of actions that are almost universally harmful to 
shareholders and generally have one thing in common: failure to disclose material financial 
information. Takeover defenses could make managers more willing to disclose critical information 
simply because they know it is the right thing to do. Stated formally, 
Hypothesis 2: The number of a firm’s takeover defense provisions is negatively associated 
with the likelihood of financial fraud. 
 
 Researchers in management, law, finance, and accounting have through the years explored 
how the expectations of external financial markets via rating agencies influence firm behaviors 
(Benner and Ranganathan, 2012; Chen et al., 2015). Securities analysts raise questions with top 
managers about firm performance and strategies during conference calls and distribute information 
to investors through reports and media outlets (Lang, Lins and Miller, 2004). These reports generally 
include forecasts of the firm’s expected future stock price and the analysts’ recommendations about 
whether to ‘buy,’ ‘hold,’ or ‘sell’ the firm’s stock (Bradshaw, 2004; Schipper, 1991).  
This line of research has shown that analysts play an important role in shaping the 
expectations imposed on managers to undertake actions (Gentry and Shen, 2013). One way analysts 
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impose pressure on managers is via their effects on stock price (Zuckerman, 2000). This occurs even 
when analysts make recommendations based on stock repurchase plans that could have vague or 
indeterminate stock price effects (Zhu and Westphal, 2011). Positive or negative recommendations 
have implications for stock purchase behavior and help determine the value of a firm’s stock. As a 
result, there is a growing body of evidence that managers are highly attentive to analyst 
recommendations and the resultant changes in stock price (Martin, 2011; Rao and Sivakumar, 1999). 
For example, one study shows that firms covered by a large number of financial analysts have less 
innovative activity, because financial analysts impose pressure to deliver consistently positive short-
term financial results (He and Tian, 2013).  
External expectations from financial analysts may come in two forms. First, sell 
recommendations reduce a firm’s stock price and therefore impose external pressure on managers to 
take action so that the firm’s performance bounces back (Stickel, 1995). Second, buy 
recommendations also introduce external pressure because managers are likely to feel the burden of 
high earnings expectations when analysts are recommending their stock to capital markets (Barsky, 
2008; Mishina et al., 2010). In contrast to buy and sell recommendations, a hold recommendation 
should result in shareholders devoting less attention to firms, so this represents the lowest level of 
external pressure from analysts, and in fact most recommendations are hold. 
Agency theory envisions securities analysts collectively as an external governance 
mechanism, keeping managers in check by reducing information asymmetry between principals and 
agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Seeking to gain investor following, analysts are concerned with 
obtaining the most comprehensive information they can get about publicly traded firms and issuing 
insightful recommendations to shareholders (Womack, 1996). Investors pay close heed to analyst 
recommendations, lending particularly close attention to those firms to whom the analysts 
recommend attention (Beunza and Garud, 2007; Brown, Wei and Wermers, 2013). Thus, in the 
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agency framework, we should expect external expectations that arise from security analyst 
recommendations to be negatively associated with financial fraud. 
Again, cognitive evaluation theory introduces a different perspective on securities analyst 
ratings. Some scholars have found that high performance expectations can actually lead to 
fraudulent behavior owing to the increased pressure leaders feel because of those expectations 
(Schweitzer, Ordóñez and Douma, 2004). This may be particularly true of analyst ratings because 
missing analyst forecasts can precipitate drops in stock price, reduced managerial compensation 
(Chen et al., 2015), or even dismissal (Wiersema and Zhang, 2011). In this sense, ‘sell’ 
recommendations can impose great pressure on managers. Similarly, when analysts recommend ‘buy’ 
it also introduces pressure on managers, wherein top managers are compelled to meet high 
expectations. Research suggests that this pressure may be accentuated by stock market overreaction 
to these analyst recommendations (Brown et al., 2013). When external pressure from analysts is high, 
it could lead top managers to make decisions that violate their codes of conduct but help achieve 
tangible objectives (e.g., meeting analyst expectations or turning around company performance) 
(Hirsch and Pozner, 2005). Stated differently, external pressure from analysts could introduce high 
performance expectations on managers, making them less concerned with doing the right thing than 
they are with outward perceptions of compliance. As a result, we expect this external governance 
mechanism could have an adverse effect on managerial behavior, as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: Pressure from security analysts’ recommendations is positively associated 




We tested our hypotheses on a longitudinal dataset covering the years 1999-2012. The sample used 
in this study starts with all firms in the in the S&P 1500 index during our sampling window, as well 
as a few other large public firms included in the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). 
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The dependent variable data are from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). Data on institutional ownership, takeover defense 
provisions, and securities analysts are from Thomson Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings, the 
IRRC, and Thomson Reuters IBES respectively. Financial data are from Compustat and the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We collected top manager compensation and governance 
data from ExecuComp and Risk Metrics.  
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable of our study is commitment of financial fraud. Since 1982, the SEC has issued 
AAERs during or at the conclusion of an investigation against a company, an auditor, or an 
individual for alleged accounting or auditing misconduct (Dechow et al., 2011). The SEC takes 
enforcement actions against firms that it identifies as having violated the financial reporting 
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Given budget constraints, the SEC chooses 
firms for enforcement action when there is strong evidence of accounting manipulation. In general, 
firms the SEC selects have already admitted restating earnings or having unusually large write-offs 
(e.g., Enron and Xerox) (Dechow et al., 2011).  
To identify fraud commitment years accurately, we read each AAER entry to identify the 
years when financial fraud actually occurred and matched them to our independent and control 
variables based on fraud commitment years. We identified a total number of 265 cases of fraud 
commitment firm years for our sample firms. The primary advantage of our chosen 
operationalization is that firms selected for SEC enforcement are almost certainly guilty of 
fraudulent financial reporting (i.e., Type I error is low) (Dechow et al., 2011). Fraud commitment 
receives a value of ‘1’ if a firm commits financial fraud in a year and is later detected by the SEC and 




Our first independent variable is dedicated institutional ownership. We followed Bushee (2001) to identify 
dedicated institutional investors among all the institutional investors reported in Thomson Reuter 
Institutional (13F) Holdings. This approach relies on a factor and cluster analysis to classify 
institutional investors into different types. The classification is based on portfolio turnover, 
momentum trading strategies, and portfolio diversification strategies (Bushee, 2001). We identified 
dedicated institutional investors, which are low on all three factors, for each sample firm and 
calculated their average holdings across four quarters for each year. Dedicated institutional 
ownership is the ratio of total shares held by dedicated institutional investors to total shares 
outstanding (Connelly et al., 2010b). 
Our second independent variable is takeover defenses. We measured the number of takeover 
defense provisions as the sum of the following six indicator variables: staggered board, limitation on 
amending bylaws, limitation on amending the charter, supermajority to approve a merger, golden 
parachute, and poison pill. Findings by Bebchuk et al. (2009) suggest these six takeover defense 
provisions play the most important role in shielding managers from the market for corporate control 
and are of greatest relevance to managerial entrenchment. Because the IRRC published takeover 
defense provision data every other year until 2004, we followed existing work by Bebchuk et al. 
(2009) and replaced the four years in our sampling window that did not have IRRC coverage with 
data from immediately subsequent years.  
The third independent variable is analyst recommendation pressure. We measured this as the sum 
of the average percent of sell recommendations and the average percent of buy recommendations 
issued by securities analysts across different quarters for each year. We focus on sell and buy 
recommendations because these two types of recommendations have important implications on the 
trading behavior of individual investors and fund managers (Stickel, 1995). Sell recommendations 
suggest that rated stocks are likely to underperform relative to the market or its previous 
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performance whereas buy recommendations suggest that rated stocks are likely to outperform the 
market within the next six to twelve months. As we argued, sell and buy recommendations introduce 
powerful external earnings expectations on managers, while hold recommendations present the least 
pressure. 
Control variables for fraud commitment 
Our chosen method of analysis, bivariate probit models, mandates that we develop separate models 
with fraud commitment as one dependent variable and fraud detection as a different dependent 
variable (Wang, 2013; Wang, Winton and Yu, 2010). We follow Wang’s (2013) guidelines for control 
variables that could increase the likelihood of fraud commitment.  
First, we control for a range of firm-level characteristics. We control for firm performance using 
return on assets (ROA). We also control for firm size using the natural logarithm of total assets. The 
fraud literature suggests that managers of firms with high levels of external financing need are more 
likely to commit fraud than managers of firms with lower need (Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998). We 
follow Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) to measure this as a firm’s asset growth rate in 
excess of the maximum internally financeable growth rate: asset growth rate - ROA/(1-ROA). We 
control for firm leverage using the ratio of total short- and long-term debt to total assets.  
We also control for three variables related to firm risk-taking activities that are associated 
with fraud commitment (Wang, 2013). These are capital expenditure intensity measured as capital 
expenditure divided by total sales revenues, R&D intensity measured as R&D expenditure divided by 
total sales revenues, and acquisition intensity measured as total annual acquisition expenditure divided 
by total sales revenues. 
We control for a number of executive characteristics as well. We control for top management 
team (TMT) equity ownership, measured as the total percent of equity ownership held by all the top 
executives reported in ExecuComp. We control for TMT option pay, measured as the ratio of total 
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TMT option pay value to total TMT pay. We control for board independence measured as the total 
number of independent outside directions divided by board size and for the percent of directors 
appointed by CEOs, measured as the ratio of directors appointed by CEOs to board size. We control 
for outside directors’ ownership, measured as the ratio of shares held by outside directors to total shares 
outstanding and for CEO duality, which receives a value of ‘1’ if a CEO is also Board Chair. We 
control for analyst coverage, measured as the number of analysts covering a firm. Lastly, we control for 
the post-SOX period which is ‘1’ for years after (and including) 2002 and ‘0’ otherwise because 
governance reforms triggered by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) may deter managers from 
committing financial fraud.   
Control variables for fraud detection 
Fraud detection describes when firms commit fraud and the SEC catches them for doing so. 
To model the likelihood of fraud detection we include some control variables that overlap with the 
control variables used to model the likelihood of fraud commitment. Control variables used in both 
the fraud commitment (P(F)) and fraud detection (P(D|F)) are possible indicators not only that a 
firm will commit fraud but also that they will be caught. When we include a control in both fraud 
commitment and fraud detection models, we operationalize the variable the same in both models. 
However, our models for the likelihood of fraud detection contain some unique control 
variables that we do not use in our models of fraud commitment. For instance, the SEC could be 
more likely to select for investigation firms that operate in industries where securities lawsuits are 
common, so we control for abnormal industry litigation. To measure this, we calculate industry litigation 
intensity, measured as the natural logarithm of the total market value of all litigated firms in an 
industry year (using 2-digit SIC codes). Abnormal industry litigation is the annual deviation from the 
average litigation intensity in an industry. We also control for abnormal ROA, which can flag a firm as 
a potential problem, using the residual from the regression: 1 0 1 0 2 -1ROA =α +α ROA +α ROA +ε . 
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Similarly, we control for annual stock returns because the SEC may target for enforcement firms with 
sharp changes in stock returns. For the same reason, we control for abnormal return volatility, measured 
as the demeaned standard deviation of monthly stock returns in a year, and abnormal stock turnover, 
measured as the natural logarithm of the demeaned monthly turnover in a year. Lastly, we include a 
measure of total institutional ownership in our fraud detection models because research shows that 
institutional investors could play a role in discovering fraud (Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 2010). 
METHODS AND RESULTS 
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics, including means, standard deviations, and correlations 
of variables used in this study. Table 2 presents the results of bivariate probit models. P(F) models 
the likelihood of fraud commitment and P(D|F) models the likelihood of fraud detection given 
fraud commitment.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Analysis 
Corporate fraud is a rare event. Given the low rate of occurrence within our population of firms, 
examining the data using hazard models or conditional logistic regressions with matched pairs could 
be appropriate (Carberry and King, 2012). Yet, there are two latent processes associated with 
corporate fraud: firms that engage in fraud (i.e., fraud commitment) and those that the SEC actually 
catches in the act of fraud (i.e., fraud detection). We are interested in the former but can only 
observe the latter. Traditional methods are limited to examining the observable firms that have been 
caught in the act of fraud, ignoring firms that have committed fraud but not (or not yet) been 
caught. The underlying assumption is that firms that are cheating and getting away with it are 




We attempt to address this problem methodologically by using bivariate probit regressions 
with partial observability, following the works of Wang et al. (2010) and Wang (2013). Bivariate 
probit regressions model fraud detection and fraud commitment simultaneously, thus mitigating 
biases caused by the presence within our sample of firms that have engaged in fraud but not yet 
been detected. This is an important distinction because our theory describes why firms might 
actually engage in financial fraud, not whether the SEC catches them in the act. Of course, neither 
the traditional methods nor our bivariate probit models account for the possibility that firms may 
have had an SEC enforcement action against them when in fact they did nothing wrong. However, 
given the extensive nature SEC investigations and the burden of proof they must overcome, we 
expect it is a safe assumption that there are few, if any, firms that are innocent victims of the SEC 
enforcement. 
To explain how bivariate probit models work, let ܨ௜∗ represent firm i’s propensity to commit 
fraud, and ܦ௜∗ represent the firm’s likelihood of being detected conditional on fraud being 





    (1),
   (2)
i F i F i






   
where ݔி,௜ is a row vector with variables that explain the propensity for firm i to commit fraud, and 
ݔ஽,௜ is a second row vector with variables that explain the firm’s likelihood of getting caught 
conditional on fraud commitment. The variables ݑ௜ and ݒ௜ are zero-mean disturbances with a 
bivariate normal distribution and variances normalized to unity because we cannot estimate the 
variances. The correlation between ݑ௜ and ݒ௜ is ρ (Wang, 2013). 
To model fraud commitment, we transform ܨ௜∗ into a binary variable ܨ௜ , where ܨ௜ = 1 if 
ܨ௜∗ ൐ 0, and ܨ௜ ൌ 0 otherwise. To model fraud detection conditional on fraud commitment, we 
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transform ܦ௜∗ into a binary variable in the same way. We cannot observe all the realizations of ܨ௜∗ 
and ܦ௜∗, but note that 
  (3)i i iZ F D    
where ܼ௜ ൌ 1	if firm i has committed fraud and been detected, and ܼ௜ ൌ 0 otherwise. With Ф as the 
bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution function, the empirical model for estimating ܼ௜ is 
       
         
i i i i i F,i F D,i D
i i i i i i i F,i F D,i D
P Z =1 = P FD =1 = P F =1,D =1 = F x b ,x b ,      (4)
P Z =0 = P FD =0 = P F = 0,D = 0 +P F =1,D = 0 =1-F x b ,x b ,   (5)

   
Poirier (1980) and Feinstein (1990) suggest that the conditions for full identification of the 
model parameters have two requirements. First, ݔி,௜ and ݔ஽,௜ must not include the same variables. 
As noted in the variable section, we mainly follow Wang (2013) to identify key variables that 
influence the propensity of fraud commitment and the likelihood of fraud detection. The second 
requirement is that predictor variables need to exhibit substantial variation in the sample. As a result, 
the model can be identified more easily if ݔி,௜ and ݔ஽,௜ include continuous instead of indicator 
variables (Wang, 2013). This explains why we did not include industry dummy variables and year 
dummy variables in our bivariate probit models, because inclusion of too many dummies without 
sufficient variation can lead to estimation failure. Given that we cannot include industry fixed-effects 
in regressions, we cluster standard errors by two-digit SIC codes to address potential correlations 
among residuals of firms in the same industry (Khanna, Kim and Lu, 2015). We then estimate 
bivariate probit models using the maximum-likelihood method, as follows:  
     
     
1 0
, , , ,
1
, ,  log( 1) log( 0)
                   { log Φ , , 1 log[1 Φ , , ]}   (6)
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P(F) in Model 1 of Table 2 introduces the first independent variable, dedicated institutional 
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ownership. The coefficient estimate of dedicated investors is positive (β=1.913, p=0.026), lending 
support to Hypothesis 1, which suggests a positive relationship between the level of dedicated 
institutional ownership and the likelihood of committing financial fraud. In terms of economic 
significance, when dedicated institutional ownership increases from mean (0.045) to mean plus one 
standard deviation (0.112), holding all other variables at their means, the likelihood of firms’ 
committing financial fraud will increase by 36%. In P(D|F) in Model 1, the coefficient estimate of 
institutional ownership is positive but statistically not significant, suggesting that institutional 
ownership may not influence fraud detection.   
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Hypothesis 2 states that takeover defenses are negatively associated with the likelihood of 
committing financial fraud. The estimated coefficient for takeover defense provisions in P(F) of 
Model 2 is negative and is associated with a p-value of 0.008 (β=-0.202, p = 0.008), consistent with 
Hypothesis 2. In terms of economic impact, when the number of takeover defense provisions 
increases from zero to one, holding all other variables at their means, the likelihood of firms’ 
committing financial fraud is expected to decrease by 37%. In P(D|F) in Model 2, the coefficient 
estimate of takeover defense is statistically not significant, indicating that takeover defense 
provisions may not bear a relationship with the likelihood of fraud detection.  
Hypothesis 3 states that earnings pressure from analyst recommendations is positively 
associated with the likelihood of committing financial fraud. The estimated coefficient for this 
independent variable in P(F) of Model 3 is positive and is associated with a p-value of 0.005 
(β=1.056, p=0.005), supporting Hypothesis 3. In terms of economic magnitude, when analyst 
pressure increases from mean (0.560) to mean plus one standard deviation (0.785), holding all other 
variables at their means, the likelihood of firms’ committing financial fraud is expected to increase 
by 82%. In P(D|F) in Model 2, the coefficient estimate of analyst pressure is statistically not 
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significant, indicating that analyst pressure may not bear a relationship with the likelihood of fraud 
detection. 
Additional analyses 
In our main study and analysis, we theorize that and test whether external monitoring and pressure 
from dedicated investors, the market for corporate control, and financial analysts result in higher 
levels of financial fraud. One could make additional related arguments, though, that a moderate 
amount of external pressure may be necessary and discourage top managers from committing 
financial fraud, even if too much external pressure exacerbates fraud. Therefore, in supplementary 
analyses, we tested whether there were curvilinear relationships between our independent variables 
and dependent variable. However, we failed to find statistical support for such relationships. Results 
for this analysis and other unreported results are available from the authors on request. 
Also, as described in our theory and methods, we examined external pressure from analyst 
recommendations in terms of both buy and sell recommendations. To investigate this further in a 
post-hoc manner, we subsequently considered the individual relationships between buy/sell 
recommendations and fraud commitment. We found that the coefficient estimate of the percent of 
buy recommendations is positive and is statistically significant, whereas the coefficient estimate of 
the percent of sell recommendations is positive but statistically not significant. This suggests that 
high earnings expectations from positive analyst recommendations appear to exert a stronger 
influence on top managers’ motivation to commit financial fraud compared to the pressure 
managers feel from having to turn around performance in the face of negative recommendations. 
As described in the analysis section above, our chosen methodology is a unique approach to 
investigating the likelihood of fraud. Therefore, we confirm our results using an alternative method 
based on a matched-pair sample (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Cumming, Leung and Rui, 2015; 
Gomulya and Boeker, 2014; O'Connor et al., 2006). For each fraud firm, we found a control firm 
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that is most similar to fraud firm in terms of firm size (log assets) and Tobin’s q and belongs to the 
same Fama and French 12 industry classification (Fama and French, 1997). We require that control 
firms have never been charged with fraud. To analyze the matched-pair sample, we used conditional 
logistic regressions, which recognize the conditional nature of the probabilities that matched-pair 
samples create (Manski and Lerman, 1977). Conditional logistic regressions control for time-
invariant paired fixed-effects, but cannot address potential biases caused by fraud that has been 
committed but not detected. In unreported results, we find support for our three hypotheses.  
Supplementary study 
The analyses above suffer from some limitations common to studies of archival data. For example, 
our control variables cannot account for all possible alternative explanations and the control 
variables we include could overlap with the explained variance of our predictors, thus changing what 
it is our predictors are actually measuring (Audia, Locke and Smith, 2000). Another problem with 
archival studies of market data is that we cannot actually measure people’s thoughts, but rather are 
limited to viewing outcomes. This may be important because our theory deals with intrinsic 
motivation, and with archival analyses we make inferences about how managers are motivated based 
on how we see them behaving.  
Therefore, we develop a supplementary study, the details of which we provide in an online 
appendix, to observe managerial decision-making directly in a more controlled environment (Priem, 
Walters and Li, 2011). We used a policy capturing approach in a survey-based study with strengths, 
and limitations, that are complementary to our prior analyses. In short, we ask executives to imagine 
they are the CEO of a small but publicly traded company. The company received a sale a few days 
into Q1 of the current fiscal year, but it would help the CEO if he/she could book it in Q4 of the 
prior year, which is when most of the work for the sale actually occurred anyway. Results are 
presented in Table 3.  
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
We analyze the data using hierarchical linear modelling to account for both within-person 
and between-person variance (Spence and Keeping, 2010). The dependent variable is managers’ 
reaction, which is how they would actually report the sale. For each scenario, participants select their 
response on a seven-point Likert scale to the statement “Based solely on the information provided 
here, I might consider reporting the sale in Q4 of the prior year.” Answers range from “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree.” We inform respondents that they should report the sale in Q1, but 
reporting it in Q4 would engender both personal benefits and risk to the firm. In other words, 
indicating they would report the sale in Q4 is equivalent to intent to commit fraud.  
Model 1 in Table 3 shows the effects of the control variables.  Model 2 in Table 3 shows our 
supplementary study’s measurement of the main effects advanced in Hypotheses 1 through 3, with 
the dependent variable being intent to commit fraud. Consistent with the results from our main 
study, the coefficient estimate of pressure from shareholders is positive (β=0.086, p=0.064), 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. Also in Model 2, the coefficient estimate of takeover defenses is 
negative (β=-0.077, p=0.097), consistent with Hypothesis 2. The drop in significance level may be 
due to the small number of observations used in this study. The coefficient estimate of analyst 
pressure is positive (β=0.121, p=0.009), supporting Hypothesis 3.  
DISCUSSION 
In this study, we extend agency theory by examining external mechanisms of corporate governance 
in view of managerial cognitions. We find empirical support for the notion that external governance 
can dampen managers’ intrinsic motivation to act in the interest of shareholders, increasing their 
likelihood of financial fraud. Each of the three external governance mechanisms under investigation 
− activist shareholders, the market for corporate control, and rating agencies − provides unique 





Our results hold the potential for contributing to the literature in several ways. Foremost, behavioral 
agency theory incorporates cognitive biases into agency theory assumptions about internal 
governance (Martin et al., 2013; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998), but this stream of research 
devotes less attention to external governance. Our study adds to the academic community’s 
understanding of agency theory by introducing a key behavioral consideration into agency theory’s 
predictions about external governance. In so doing, our study questions the utility of external 
governance mechanisms for reigning in the potential for moral hazard, in our case in the form of 
managerial financial fraud. Whereas the governance literature has prescribed (over the long years of 
research in corporate governance) several alignment mechanisms that policymakers expect to work 
most of the time, our study shows that some of these mechanisms may not work as expected. 
Our study also potentially provides new insights into the consequences of investor activism. 
Agency theory suggests that dedicated institutional investors, who are well known for their activist 
approach to ownership (Goranova and Ryan, 2014), can mitigate agency problems because they 
have incentive to monitor managers and the ability to bring about change due to the size of their 
holdings (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Existing studies lend empirical support to the notion that 
dedicated investors can be conducive to mitigating managerial risk aversion and encouraging 
managers to make decisions that create long-term value for the firm (Bushee, 1998; Connelly et al., 
2010b; Hoskisson et al., 2002). However, researchers have devoted little attention to possible 
tradeoffs of the powerful expectations imposed on managers via the external pressure of dedicated 
investors. Our results show that an ownership structure laden with dedicated investors can have 
unanticipated consequences in the form of diminished intrinsic motivation, resulting in higher 
instances of managerial financial fraud. There is an ongoing policy debate about the effects of 
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activist shareholders (Benoit and Hoffman, 2015; Gandel, 2015). Our study informs this debate by 
showing that powerful shareholders could perhaps be hurting more than helping as they magnify the 
Wall Street ‘expectations game,’ and consequently managers could abandon their own beliefs in 
order to satisfy the expectations of shareholders (Martin, 2011).  
Our findings may also contribute to research on takeover defenses. Existing studies generally 
suggest that the market perceives takeover defense provisions negatively because they result in 
reduced firm value (Gompers et al., 2003; Mahoney and Mahoney, 1993; Sundaramurthy et al., 1997). 
Research shows that managerial entrenchment brought on by takeover defenses can cushion 
managers’ exposure to the market for corporate control. Our study, however, adds that such 
protection can provide a positive effect wherein managers maintain higher levels of intrinsic 
motivation, akin to stewardship theory, as opposed to being motivated mainly by extrinsic factors, 
which are central to agency theory (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). Future research might tease 
out even further this juxtaposition of the principles and assumptions underlying cognitive evaluation 
theory and, relatedly, stewardship theory versus those that underlie agency theory.  
We also contribute to a nascent stream of literature that explores the benefits of takeover 
defense provisions. For instance, Danielson and Karpoff (2006) find that firms that have adopted 
poison pills witness modest operating performance improvement over time. Similarly, findings by 
Kacperczyk (2009) and Wang et al. (forthcoming) suggest that an exogenous increase in takeover 
protection leads managers to focus on strategic decisions that can increase shareholders’ long-term 
interests. Our results suggest that the benefits of takeover defense provisions extend beyond issues 
of performance as they discourage managers from engaging in financial fraud, which is detrimental 
to the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. Relatedly, researchers might also consider 
how different kinds of corporate governance provisions operate in different ways, such as those that 
prevent actions that could lead to a takeover versus those that take effect only if a takeover occurs. 
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Lastly, our study illustrates the power that securities analysts wield. Although analysts play an 
important role as information intermediaries that can help reduce information asymmetry between 
investors and companies, their recommendations introduce powerful expectations on managers to 
perform, which could influence their financial reporting decisions. While much of the research on 
rating agencies focuses on how investors react to analyst recommendations, our study builds on the 
more limited amount of research (Gentry and Shen, 2013; Zhu and Westphal, 2011) that explores 
how managers react, and behave differently in response, to analyst recommendations. Our study has 
focused on one type of external rating agencies (i.e., financial analysts), but future research might 
explore how other external rating agencies (e.g., journalists) shape managers’ performance 
expectations and thereby influence managerial motivations to engage in financial fraud (Shani and 
Westphal, 2016; Westphal and Deephouse, 2011).    
The focus of our study is on how performance expectations from external governance 
mechanisms crowd out top managers’ intrinsic motivation, leading to higher instances of financial 
fraud. Future research might consider whether and how this generalizes to managerial misconduct. 
Further, scholars could extend this research by considering how cognitive evaluation theory applies 
to internal governance devices, such as boards of directors and top manager compensation designs. 
Similarly, scholars might also examine whether internal and external governance devices are 
complements or substitutes. It could be, for example, that dedicated institutional investors substitute 
for vigilant boards because both introduce strong expectations on managers. If this is the case, then 
the monitoring role of vigilant boards could become less important when dedicated investors are 
present. Conversely, one could make an argument that dedicated investors complement vigilant 
boards. In this case, the two work together to inflict such weighty expectations that managers reach 




In sum, our findings suggest that policymakers may face a paradox in regulating corporate 
governance. Imposing strict external monitoring and control can decrease top managers’ intrinsic 
motivation and reduce their focus on internal values, potentially leading them to commit financial 
fraud. However, granting top managers too much freedom from external performance pressure 
could result in some managers extracting personal gains at the expense of shareholders. Perhaps 
managers can ‘earn the right’ to autonomy over time as they demonstrate that they consistently act 
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Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Financial fraud 0.017 0.128 0.000 1.000 1.000
2 Dedicated ownership 0.045 0.067 0.000 0.350 0.076 1.000
3 Takeover defense 2.569 1.344 0.000 6.000 -0.054 -0.093 1.000
4 Analyst pressure 0.560 0.225 0.000 1.000 0.061 0.078 -0.084 1.000
5 ROA 0.090 0.085 -0.230 0.352 -0.018 0.018 -0.054 0.156 1.000
6 Firm size (Log) 7.807 1.663 4.584 12.441 0.056 -0.017 0.001 -0.056 -0.092 1.000
7 External financing need 0.159 1.265 -5.768 6.971 0.018 -0.001 0.005 0.034 0.020 -0.032 1.000
8 Firm leverage 0.218 0.174 0.000 0.768 0.027 0.067 0.049 -0.023 -0.127 0.255 -0.028 1.000
9 Capital expenditure ratio 0.067 0.110 0.000 0.801 -0.011 0.035 0.008 0.091 -0.063 0.030 0.039 0.133 1.000
10 R&D intensity 0.037 0.076 0.000 0.441 0.023 0.029 -0.059 0.111 -0.221 -0.223 0.043 -0.203 0.037 1.000
11 Acquisition intensity 0.032 0.086 0.000 0.553 0.014 -0.012 0.008 0.092 -0.016 -0.034 -0.009 0.081 0.017 0.135
12 Analyst coverage 10.652 7.845 0.000 55.000 0.008 0.046 -0.066 0.061 0.159 0.516 0.001 -0.028 0.113 0.085
13 Institutional ownership 0.689 0.247 0.000 1.000 -0.051 0.144 0.129 0.086 0.166 -0.090 -0.008 -0.054 -0.018 0.029
14 TMT ownership 0.012 0.034 0.000 0.228 -0.040 -0.133 0.041 -0.044 0.003 -0.121 0.007 -0.072 -0.030 -0.017
15 TMT option pay 0.275 0.245 0.000 0.898 0.106 0.233 -0.097 0.190 0.029 -0.023 0.036 -0.093 0.040 0.318
16 Board independence 0.716 0.156 0.000 1.000 -0.079 -0.140 0.246 -0.098 -0.033 0.193 -0.012 0.050 -0.003 0.003
17 CEO appointed director 0.678 0.299 0.000 1.000 0.034 0.024 -0.079 0.046 0.007 -0.053 0.018 -0.009 0.030 -0.005
18 Outside director ownership 0.045 0.087 0.000 0.544 -0.010 0.050 -0.157 -0.007 0.029 -0.148 -0.001 -0.025 -0.032 -0.061
19 CEO duality 0.596 0.491 0.000 1.000 0.028 0.073 0.011 0.015 0.004 0.136 -0.004 0.078 0.028 -0.069
20 Abnormal industry litigation 0.655 0.824 0.000 4.729 0.039 0.013 -0.055 0.046 -0.068 0.022 0.041 -0.009 0.157 0.221
21 Abnormal ROA 0.013 0.073 -0.252 0.233 -0.020 0.011 -0.055 0.162 0.992 -0.085 0.022 -0.123 -0.060 -0.217
22 Annual stock returns 0.074 0.443 -0.796 1.788 -0.030 0.012 0.024 -0.006 0.034 -0.026 -0.049 -0.020 -0.016 -0.017
23 Abnormal return volatility 0.114 0.069 0.017 1.074 0.036 0.060 0.006 0.086 -0.254 -0.287 0.036 -0.027 0.057 0.260
24 Abnormal stock turnover (Log) 11.744 1.502 4.663 18.584 0.056 -0.063 -0.009 0.073 0.052 0.647 0.022 0.047 0.090 0.167
Variable 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
11 Acquisition intensity 1.000
12 Analyst coverage 0.012 1.000
13 Institutional ownership 0.056 0.308 1.000
14 TMT ownership 0.004 -0.055 0.071 1.000
15 TMT option pay 0.051 0.153 -0.060 -0.122 1.000
16 Board independence -0.003 0.121 0.187 -0.020 -0.124 1.000
17 CEO appointed director 0.006 -0.014 -0.027 0.138 0.031 -0.113 1.000
18 Outside director ownership -0.019 -0.127 -0.166 0.120 -0.015 -0.365 -0.059 1.000
19 CEO duality -0.005 0.041 -0.053 -0.005 0.056 0.067 0.376 -0.174 1.000
20 Abnormal industry litigation 0.029 0.122 -0.019 0.013 0.124 -0.042 0.042 -0.034 -0.024 1.000
21 Abnormal ROA -0.030 0.158 0.163 0.001 0.020 -0.028 0.004 0.025 0.002 -0.063 1.000
22 Annual stock returns -0.040 0.010 0.049 -0.028 -0.078 0.017 -0.012 0.027 -0.016 -0.002 0.047 1.000
23 Abnormal return volatility -0.010 -0.130 -0.090 0.008 0.211 -0.120 0.040 0.047 -0.035 0.100 -0.254 -0.008 1.000
24 Abnormal stock turnover (Log) 0.004 0.671 0.113 -0.047 0.178 0.203 -0.048 -0.185 0.039 0.123 0.054 -0.045 0.051 1.000
Table 1. Descriptive statistics




Table 2. Bivariate probit models with fraud commitment and detection as dependent variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variables P(F) P(D|F) P(F) P(D|F) P(F) P(D|F) 
Constant -2.949 -5.231 -2.664 -4.979 -3.119 -4.994
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 0.664 -0.967 -0.719 
 (0.415) (0.383) (0.587) 
External financing need 0.032 0.027 0.044 
 (0.041) (0.263) (0.009) 
Firm leverage 0.201 0.302 0.157 
 (0.478) (0.373) (0.532) 
TMT ownership  -1.415 -1.525 -1.420 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) 
TMT option pay 0.510 0.525 0.450 
 (0.165) (0.048) (0.127) 
Board independence -0.883 -1.415 -0.566 
 (0.106) (0.068) (0.302) 
CEO appointed directors 0.991 1.023 1.007 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Outside director ownership -6.024 -6.778 -5.767 
 (0.020) (0.087) (0.027) 
CEO duality 0.010 0.061 0.096 
 (0.916) (0.688) (0.307) 
Post-SOX -0.479 -0.612 -0.541 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.018) 
Firm size 0.000 0.464 -0.014 0.380 -0.036 0.455
 (0.999) (0.020) (0.814) (0.001) (0.697) (0.095) 
Capital expenditure ratio -1.910 2.033 -1.999 -0.117 -2.748 3.900
 (0.004) (0.533) (0.013) (0.941) (0.003) (0.371) 
R&D intensity 0.236 0.412 -1.327 3.780 -0.694 1.272
 (0.801) (0.831) (0.161) (0.151) (0.603) (0.805) 
Acquisition intensity -1.098 13.311 -0.469 6.337 -1.238 13.464
 (0.181) (0.202) (0.575) (0.217) (0.394) (0.571) 
Analyst coverage -0.189 -0.443 -0.122 -0.700 -0.046 -0.407
 (0.015) (0.110) (0.097) (0.007) (0.876) (0.616) 
Institutional ownership 0.806 2.267  2.121
 (0.376) (0.013)  (0.255) 
Abnormal industry litigation 0.293 0.425  0.334
 (0.052) (0.010)  (0.059) 
Abnormal ROA -1.008 2.926  0.938
 (0.608) (0.379)  (0.816) 
Annual stock returns 0.440 0.296  0.500
 (0.210) (0.060)  (0.354) 
Abnormal return volatility 0.233 0.817  0.911
 (0.912) (0.668)  (0.801) 
Abnormal stock turnover 0.315 0.496  0.302
 (0.030) (0.001)  (0.279) 
Dedicated ownership 1.913  
 (0.026)  
Takeover defense -0.202 0.397  
 (0.008) (0.107)  
Analyst pressure 1.056 -1.587
 (0.005) (0.247) 
Observations 15,845 15,032  14,729
Chi-squared 2180 285.6  2433 
Log-likelihood -986.3 -854   -793.1
Note: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by two-digit SIC codes. We do not control for 







Table 3. Hierarchical regression of intent to commit fraud 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Controls Main effects 
Experience -0.071 -0.071 
 [0.031] [0.031] 
Gender -0.658 -0.658 
 [0.326] [0.326] 
Locus of causality 0.131 0.131 
 [0.839] [0.839] 
CEO power -0.050 -0.050 
 [0.281] [0.275]   
Shareholder pressure 0.086 
 [0.064] 
Takeover defense  -0.077 
 [0.097] 
Analyst pressure 0.121 
 [0.009]   
Race (dummy variables) Included Included 
Education (dummy variables) Included Included 
Raised place (dummy variables) Included Included 
Constant 4.802 4.802 
 [3.231] [3.231]   
Chi-squared 17.63 30.65 
Log-likelihood -722.8 -722.9 
Note: N=456. p-values based on Huber-White robust errors reported in 
brackets.   
 
